The military gains made by forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in southern Yemen mark a significant turning point in the country’s political and military conflicts.
The latest fighting is between the STC and internationally recognised Yemeni government, known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), and led by Rashad al-Alimi. The irony here is that the STC, led by Aidarus al-Zubaidi, is also a member of the Yemeni PLC. But the relationship between the two groups is shaky and at times, turbulent.
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Yemen’s government condemned the STC’s latest military advance and land grab across the south and labelled the group separatists – calling their action a “unilateral and a blatant violation of the transitional phase’s framework”.
On the ground, STC forces have completed their control over the remaining southern governorates, furthering the group’s efforts to revive its decades-old aspiration of establishing an independent state in the south of Yemen.
The battle of Hadramout
The latest and rapid developments are redrawing the map of control in Yemen, and it could have further implications on the future of a strong, coherent and unified country.
The fall of Hadramout last week was sudden, and it was seen as a shocking development – although it came after a long period of tension in the oil-rich province. The Yemeni government remained more of a bystander – maintaining some military brigades stationed in its camps in the governorates of Hadramout and al-Mahra. While local and tribal proxies affiliated with regional countries, they were competing for control and influence.
Taking advantage of its superior military equipment and massive forces, the STC advanced nearly unchallenged to overtake Hadramout and al-Mahra.
The government forces lacked modern weapons, sufficient manpower and perhaps the willingness to fight.
The fall of Hadramout was pivotal and posed greater importance in the eyes of many Yemeni politicians, given the special status of this governorate locally and regionally. It dealt a final blow to what remained of the components of Yemeni unity and the government’s legitimacy, and it thwarted all the bets that considered Hadramout to be immune from falling to STC forces.
Both the incoming STC forces and government and local tribal fighters had their own alliances and allegiances to competing regional powers – with connections and loyalties with tribal leaders, politicians and local actors in Hadramout.
Why does Hadramout matter?
Hadramout is a crucial and essential governorate in Yemen, occupying more than a third of the country’s area, approximately 200,000 square kilometres (77,000 square miles), with a population of nearly two million.
It is home to the largest share of Yemen’s oil wealth, containing the most important oil fields and export terminals. Furthermore, it is a stronghold of Yemeni and Arab Gulf businessmen and a cradle of cultural and historical wealth. In short, Hadramout is the Yemeni governorate that possesses the elements of a fully fledged state, and its inhabitants had hoped to establish a Hadrami state that would restore their past glories, far removed from the political and military conflict that engulfed the rest of Yemen’s governorates.
Hadramout governorate has always had a unique political and administrative character throughout all eras and political systems, especially during the socialist regime that ruled the South from the early 1970s until 1990, when the two Yemeni parts, North and South, unified.
This unique character continued under the unified state, as Hadramout remained governed by its own people and refused to accept officials from outside its geographical boundaries. Consequently, the people of Hadramout consider the STC’s control over it an unprecedented occupation, given that most of the STC’s leaders come from the Lahj and Dhale governorates, which are marginal areas – and that would be unacceptable for them. Therefore, the stability and continuity of the STC’s authority in the governorate are doubtful because the group lacks local and popular support.
‘Divorce without return’
These repercussions will undoubtedly cast a shadow over the eight-member PLC in Yemen, headed by Rashad al-Alimi, who, along with his cabinet members and his guards, was expelled from the presidential palace in the al-Maashiq district of Aden.
Many considered this a “divorce without return” and a disastrous end to all previous understandings and agreements aimed at maintaining a political order based on shared principles that would not harm any party.
In light of these developments, the legitimate government now only controls modest areas of land in the governorates of Taiz and Marib.
But Marib is already besieged by Houthi forces from the north, and by the STC forces from the south. The Houthis are a group backed by Iran and control the capital and the north and northwestern parts of Yemen. Taiz is besieged by the Houthis from the north and from the east by the forces of Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, the son of the ousted Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.
It is not unlikely that these areas will fall into the hands of either of these two powerful parties at any moment. If that happens, the legitimate Yemeni government will become just a piece of paper, even though it practically lacks any influence on the ground since the rise of the STC forces and the growing power of the Houthis.
The unattainable southern aspiration for secession
As political sociology researcher Fayrouz al-Wali says, the STC does not have the authority to declare southern independence, despite its military control on the ground, because this decision rests not with it but with external regional powers that have deep interests in southern Yemen.
She noted that the path to statehood in the south does not lead through the gates of the Ma’ashiq Palace in Aden, but rather through the United Nations Security Council, where regional powers could play a pivotal role.
There is also a realisation that it would be difficult for the STC to declare independence in the foreseeable future, at least, because of the lack of essential resources to fund the budget of a nascent state without even the most basic elements of sustainability. Such a state would inherit an empty treasury from a country exhausted by more than a decade of war.
In addition to the economic, security and military challenges, and the lack of public services, the southern state envisioned by the STC would face discord with neighbouring powerful countries and other nations that do not wish to see Yemen fragmented into warring mini-states. This would create an unstable security situation with dire consequences for the entire region.
