Grab what you can while you can: The new reality in the South China Sea After years of watching China create land to back its expansive claims, others are doing the same. 36 mins agoAsia

Antelope Reef is a small, teardrop-shaped island in the north-western corner of the South China Sea and, until recently, almost entirely underwater.

But this year it has undergone a dramatic transformation.

Millions of tonnes of sand have been dredged from the sea bed to create solid land. From being only a turquoise speck on the map, Antelope Reef now appears as a 6-sq-km (2.3-sq-mile) crescent of gleaming white sand, with a scattering of buildings in one corner. All in just six months.

In the lagoon formed by the crescent dozens of ships can be seen. These are almost certainly cutter suction dredgers, of which China has the world’s largest fleet: some of them can scoop up 6,000 cubic metres an hour, enough to fill two Olympic-sized swimming pools.

But China is not the only one doing this.

After years of watching China creating land to back its expansive territorial claims Vietnam too is now building up some of the reefs it holds in the South China Sea. To a lesser extent other claimants, like the Philippines, are doing the same.

Antelope Reef is in the Paracel Islands, which, together with the Spratlys, are disputed territory, claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

Most of the islands are, as Antelope was until this year, submerged reefs which in the past had no human settlements. China took control of the Paracels back in 1974, after a fierce battle with what were then South Vietnamese forces.

More recently it dredged three reefs in the Spratlys – Mischief, Fiery Cross and Subi – turning them into islands big enough to construct airports and military bases, and claiming almost the entire South China Sea as its sovereign territory within the infamous nine-dash line it has drawn on the map.

Swarms of Chinese coastguard and maritime militia ships now patrol inside the nine-dash line, overwhelming attempts by other claimants to challenge Chinese supremacy. In recent years there have been several clashes with the much smaller Philippines coastguard in areas they both claim.

The straight-line edge on one of the newly-made beaches on Antelope Reef suggests China may be building another military-grade runway there, similar to those on Mischief, Fiery Cross and Subi reefs.

But they already have a well-established airstrip nearby on Woody Island. Building another in an area close to the big Chinese military bases on Hainan seems superfluous.

Instead, China may be sending a message to Vietnam.

Vietnam and China have a history of sparring over the South China Sea, or the East Sea as Vietnam calls it.

In recent years though, the communist authorities in Vietnam have dialled down the anti-Chinese rhetoric, and worked hard to build closer relations with Beijing.

Recently-elected president and party general secretary To Lam made his first state visit this year to China, where both countries referred to their differences over the Paracels and Spratlys in unusually conciliatory language.

Vietnam has formally protested against China’s construction on Antelope Reef, but only in restrained, diplomatic terms.

However, out on the disputed reefs, Vietnam has gone on a dredging spree, using the same powerful cutter suction ships as China.

Over the past three years it has been pumping sand around at least 20 reefs and, according to the Washington-based Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, it has created 11 new harbours.

It now controls more than 11 sq km of reclaimed land, about half the area that China controls.

It is now starting to build military-grade infrastructure like navigation beacons. Vietnam’s approach appears to be that if you can’t beat China, then join it.

“The Vietnamese have been less willing to be at the forefront of the public relations battle over their disagreements with China,” says Greg Poling, who runs the AMTI.

“They’re much more comfortable letting the Filipinos do that. But on the water we have seen the Vietnamese being far more willing to stand up to Beijing. As a result, the Chinese have mostly backed off from, for example, trying to prevent Vietnamese drilling for oil and gas.”

This is why China is building out Antelope Reef at such a rapid pace, says Ray Powell, the director of Sealight, which is based in Stanford University and monitors the South China Sea.

“Vietnam has been taking advantage of China’s focus on the Philippines… The reclamation at Antelope Reef could be considered as China’s answer, reminding Vietnam who the big dog on the porch is.”

So where does this leave the rest of the claimants to the Spratlys?

For the past 30 years the Association of South East Asian Nations, or Asean, has tried to negotiate a code of conduct between China and its four member states who are also claimants.

In 2002 they did agree on a much weaker declaration but this was not binding, and China has largely ignored it.

Every year at the annual Asean summit leaders promise to push for an enforceable code of conduct, but at the end of every year they seem no closer to getting it.

In frustration over this lack of progress, the Philippines took China’s actions to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2013.

The court ruled decisively in favour of the Philippines, concluding that China’s claims to sovereignty within the nine-dash line had no historical validity, and that its actions such as turning reefs into islands violated international law and infringed on the rights of the Philippines to an exclusive economic zone off its west coast.

China has simply ignored that ruling, prompting the Philippines to switch to trying to shame Beijing by sending its own hugely outnumbered coastguard ships to challenge the Chinese flotilla. This results in multiple clashes, but little change in the unequal balance of power.

The Philippines has also expanded its military co-operation with the United States, and sought new alliances with countries like Japan and Australia. The US has given firm diplomatic support, $500m in military aid and supplied some new equipment.

Together with other allies it periodically sends the US navy through the South China Sea on Freedom of Navigation Operations as a reminder that these are still legally international sea lanes, despite China’s claims. But these missions only make a point. They make little real difference.

Now the Philippines too is building up the toeholds it has in the South China Sea.

It is expanding the runway at Pagasa Island, also known as Thitu, putting a coastguard base there, and reinforcing the rusting landing craft BRP Sierra Madre which it grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal in 1999. It keeps a detachment of soldiers on board despite frequent harassment by Chinese ships.

“Most of the claimants have recognised that they’re never going to get to the legally binding document that the code of conduct was always meant to be,” Poling says.

“China just continues to do whatever it wants on the water, eating away at their sovereignty. So what I think you are eventually going to see is a non-binding agreement. But perhaps that will open up diplomatic space for Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia and the others to pursue more effective negotiations among themselves without having to go through Asean.”

This now appears to be the new reality in the South China Sea.

It is every country for itself, making the most of what they already control, accepting that China will always be the biggest and most assertive player.

Graphics by Arvin Supriyadi, Aghnia Adzkia