On December 16, Sudanese political parties, armed movements, civil society organisations, and prominent political figures signed a nine-point political roadmap in Nairobi, presenting it as a civilian-led initiative aimed at ending Sudan’s war and restoring a democratic transition.
Framed as an antiwar, pro-peace platform, it seeks to position civilians as a “third pole” against the two military actors in Sudan’s conflict: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Its authors say it represents an attempt to reclaim political agency for civilians after months of marginalisation by armed actors and foreign mediators, even though the declaration does not outline any concrete steps towards military reform.
The roadmap reignited longstanding debates within Sudanese political and civic circles about representation, legitimacy, and the persistent dominance of elite-driven civilian politics.
The roadmap
The Nairobi declaration emerged after a statement released by the Quad – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States – in September.
The Quad statement called for an immediate three-month truce to lead to a permanent ceasefire, humanitarian access to help civilians, and the creation of a political process for a civilian transition.
It also emphasised excluding remnants of former President Omar al-Bashir’s regime and reforming Sudan’s security forces under civilian oversight, all points that the Nairobi declaration echoed.
The Nairobi signatories included the National Umma Party, the Sudanese Congress Party, civil society organisations – including the Darfur Lawyers Association and the Coordination of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees – and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-AW) led by Abdelwahid al-Nur.
Former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who led Sudan’s transitional civilian government from al-Bashir’s overthrow in 2019 until the October 2021 military coup by the SAF and the RSF working in concert, also signed the declaration.
It was likewise endorsed by al-Nur, longtime leader of the SLM-AW armed group that controls Jebel Marra in Darfur and has historically rejected what he describes as “elite-driven” political settlements.
Falling short
Sudanese researcher Hamid Khalafallah told media that despite the intent to present a civilian leadership, the declaration falls short of reflecting Sudan’s broader civic movement.
The Nairobi coalition, he argued, mirrors earlier civilian formations that failed to connect with Sudanese citizens, particularly those most affected by the war.
“It’s in many ways a reproduction of former groups that have … struggled to represent the Sudanese people,” he said. “It’s still very much an elite group that does politics in the same way they always have.”
Although resistance committees – neighbourhood groups that emerged from Sudan’s protest movement and helped topple al-Bashir in 2019 – were referenced in the declaration, no committees formally endorsed or signed it.
Drafts were reportedly shared with some grassroots groups, but the process advanced without waiting for collective deliberation – reinforcing concerns that civilians on the ground remain politically instrumentalised rather than empowered.
While al-Nur’s participation was hailed by some as a breakthrough, Khalafallah questioned the underlying motivation, arguing that his inclusion was intended to counterbalance rival military-aligned forces rather than transform civilian politics.
Before the Nairobi declaration, there were three main civilian coalitions in Sudan, each aligned with a warring party or accused of such an alliance.
Tasis is the coalition of political parties and armed movements that was founded in February 2025, before forming the RSF’s parallel government in July 2025, while the Democratic Bloc is a grouping of parties and armed groups aligned with the SAF.
Finally comes Hamdok’s Sumoud, comprising political parties and civil society organisations and accused by SAF of supporting the RSF.
Europe’s one-track civilian strategy
European officials have distanced themselves from the Nairobi initiative.
A senior European Union diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, told media that Brussels does not see the Nairobi roadmap as the foundation for a unified civilian process.
“We would like to see only one civilian process, that’s why we are helping the African Union [AU],” the source said. “Everything else is a distraction, like this Nairobi one.”
According to the EU official, the priority is not multiplying civilian platforms but consolidating them under a single credible framework, led by the AU and broadly accepted by Sudanese society.
“Our aim is to create a credible third pole – versus RSF and SAF,” the source said. “An inclusive one, supported by most Sudanese citizens.”
The EU plans to build a broad coalition that can take the lead after the Quad’s humanitarian truce and ceasefire proposals are accepted by the SAF and the RSF, including reforms placing security forces under civilian-led oversight.
The EU’s language reflects growing frustration among international actors with Sudan’s fragmented civilian landscape, while insisting that abandoning it would legitimise military rule by default.
“Of course, we are not naive that civilians will take over tomorrow,” the source said. “But we have to stand for our values.”
The EU official was blunt in assessing the conduct of Sudan’s warring parties, rejecting narratives that frame either side as a governing authority.
“I would not call what RSF does in Darfur ‘governing’, SAF is a bit better – but not much,” the source said.
“Look at the oil deal they did,” the official added. “Money is important; people are not.”
They referred to the latest agreement between the SAF and the RSF – under South Sudanese mediation – that both would withdraw from the Heglig oil facility, with South Sudanese troops deployed to secure the refinery following SAF’s pullout and the RSF’s capture of the site.
Warring parties as spoilers?
US-Africa policy expert Cameron Hudson told media that the Nairobi declaration appears to mimic the Quad’s recent statement, effectively presenting to the international community a roadmap that aligns with pre-existing objectives to gain Quad support.
“My sense is that the Nairobi declaration reverse engineers what the Quad has said,” Hudson said, suggesting that the initiative is designed more to attract international endorsement than to build genuine domestic consensus.
Hudson warned that this approach mishandles the sequencing of Sudan’s political transition, “prematurely” linking ceasefire efforts with reforms of the army or other political changes, arguing that these should remain on separate tracks until violence subsides.
“If what the Quad wants is an unconditional ceasefire, then it needs to pursue that, not create opportunities to trade a ceasefire for political assurances during a transition,” he said.
“For that reason, it is premature to be talking about reforming the army or other political reforms. These should remain in separate tracks for now.”
The tension is stark. The Quad and the European Union increasingly state that neither the SAF nor the RSF should have a political future and that remnants of the Bashir regime must be excluded entirely.
Yet both armed forces remain indispensable to any cessation of hostilities, creating an unresolved contradiction at the heart of international strategy.
