Beijing’s muted response shows that when core interests are at stake, even close partners are expendable.
February 28, 2026, will be remembered as the day the law of the jungle returned. On that fateful day, the United States and Israel, in flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, launched Operation Epic Fury, “raining death and destruction” on Iran.
Although it was not the first time that the US and its Israeli ally had used negotiations to lull an enemy into a false sense of security before attacking, the US-Israeli assault nonetheless caught Iran off guard. Several high-ranking Iranian officials were killed in the strikes, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Yet the attacks failed to achieve the regime change the US and Israel had anticipated. The Iranian government, bruised and bloodied but undefeated, endured.
In response, Iran attacked US military installations and diplomatic missions in the Middle East and Israel with drones and missiles. While the retaliation inflicted some damage, it fell short of deterring further attacks in the face of the other side’s overwhelming military superiority. On the contrary, US strikes intensified, culminating in the largest yet on March 10. With Iranian missile stockpiles and launchers falling dangerously low, it has become apparent that without outside intervention, Iran is fighting what could be its last stand.
China’s muted response
With Russia preoccupied with its own war, Iran waited to see whether its only other ally capable of going toe to toe with the US, China, would come to its aid. The answer came quickly. Two days into the war, during a regular news conference at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, business continued as normal, as if the US and Israel had not just attacked one of China’s comprehensive strategic partners. When it became clear that China would remain silent, an Iranian journalist protested. Only then did the ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, reluctantly condemn the US-Israeli assault.
In the days that followed, China became a vocal critic of the attacks. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued, “Might does not make right,” warning that the attacks proved that “the world has regressed to the law of the jungle.” Yet for all his strong words, Wang stopped short of explicitly naming the US or Israel as the aggressor, even if there was little doubt which countries he meant. Furthermore, China offered Iran little substantive assistance beyond rhetoric.
While China contacted several Middle Eastern countries and sent a special envoy on a diplomatic tour of the region, a move that helped prevent Iran’s neighbours, many caught in the crossfire, from joining the fray, it made no attempt to directly confront the US, the country ultimately responsible for the war, let alone send Iran military aid.
China’s response remained muted even when Iran, in a bid to provoke international intervention, closed the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime corridor through which 40 percent of China’s imported oil passes each day. Faced with a direct threat to its economic lifeline, Beijing’s only response was to call for all parties to cease hostilities and return to the negotiating table. Its priorities were clear.
That priority, of course, is Taiwan.
Iran is not as important
One month before the US-Israeli attacks, during the largest US military build-up in the Middle East since its 2003 invasion of Iraq, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held a phone call. In the US readout, the conversation covered a range of topics, including rising US-Iranian tensions.
In the Chinese version, however, the focus was on China-US relations and Taiwan while rising US-Iranian tensions were omitted. Xi reiterated that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, stressed its importance to China and China-US relations, and drew a red line at its independence. Xi also warned Trump that the US must proceed with utmost caution regarding planned arms sales to Taiwan.
In response, according to Beijing, Trump stated that he attaches great importance to China’s concerns regarding Taiwan and promised to uphold sound and stable China-US relations.
Silence on Iran on China’s part speaks volumes. It reinforces the idea that, despite Iran’s membership in Chinese-led initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, it is not as important to China as previously assumed. Crucially, it suggests that a deal securing China’s core interests has been struck and Beijing was unwilling to jeopardise those gains for a distant ally.
Indeed, facing domestic setbacks and eager to secure a trade deal with China, the US’s third-largest trading partner, to boost his approval ratings, Trump conceded to Xi’s requests in the days after their call and delayed a multibillion-dollar arms sale to Taiwan. As Trump plans to visit China soon, directly confronting the US now would risk plunging China-US relations back into icy waters, an outcome China has long sought to avoid, while sending Iran weapons could prompt the US to reciprocate in kind regarding Taiwan.
The war does not pose a threat to China
Although the US declared in its 2025 National Security Strategy that it no longer views China as an adversary and has stepped back from its role as the world’s policeman, retreating to the Western Hemisphere in line with the “Donroe Doctrine”, Beijing harbours no illusion that the rivalry has ended or that Washington will go quietly. Consequently, China believes that as long as it poses a threat to Taiwan, a US ally and what Beijing considers a renegade province, the US will prioritise containing its rise over being drawn into another Middle Eastern quagmire.
Hence, despite Trump’s insistence that all options remain on the table, the US is unlikely to fully commit to a war with Iran. The conflict will likely remain confined to air strikes without putting boots on the ground. Given that previous US efforts to induce regime change have succeeded only when supported by US or allied ground troops, as seen in Iraq and Libya, the absence of both infers that while the US may significantly weaken Iran, toppling its government remains unlikely.
While Trump still lacks a realistic endgame, what is becoming increasingly clear is that, amid mounting pressure from US allies and growing domestic dissatisfaction over rising oil prices, the war will likely end soon with Trump himself signalling that he is searching for an off-ramp.
As such, the war is unlikely to pose an existential threat to China’s economy. Even if the conflict continues, as long as it remains under four months, China is well positioned to weather the shock of rising oil prices, cushioned by the vast oil stockpile it had amassed in anticipation of such contingencies.
Even if the US were to topple the Iranian government, China’s position as the world’s largest importer of oil and gas means that any new pro-US government would seek to maintain cordial relations with Beijing. After all, any Iranian government would remain heavily dependent on oil and gas revenue.
In this sense, Iran would come to resemble many other countries, economically reliant on China and militarily dependent on the US. Some Chinese scholars even suggest that lifting US sanctions could paradoxically lead to increased Chinese investment in Iran as investors would no longer have to fear US extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Should China remain idle while that happens, however, it will not only erode its status as a great power but also expose an uncomfortable truth. While Beijing may publicly denounce the idea that “might makes right,” its decision to leave a partner to fend for itself when its own core interests are at stake suggests something more enduring: Might still sets the limits of principle.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect media’s editorial stance.
