After the failure in Gaza and Iran, the Israeli prime minister hopes he can be triumphant in Lebanon.
The Israeli rhetoric about the war on Lebanon is simple. Israel has been fighting with Hezbollah since 1982 – first for 18 years inside Lebanon, and then for two decades from Israeli territory. The ongoing operation has been coming for 20 years.
Despite past successes, Hezbollah continues to be a threat to northern communities in Israel. The Israeli army is not only clearing Lebanon’s south of its infrastructure, but also putting pressure – militarily – on the Lebanese state to disarm it.
I have outlined these Israeli rationales because the Middle East has gotten used to hearing them being rolled out in procession every time Israel decides to “go aggressive”.
The reality is that Lebanon is a perfect target for Israeli sentiments. It has a weak military, and the Lebanese state apparatus is in constant flux due to power arrangements between Christians and Sunni and Shia Muslims. Lebanon also has Israel’s most consistent military foe right on its border with Israel.
Still, these are mostly a “strategic” cover for the most potent rationale that drives the present campaign against Lebanon. That rationale revolves mostly around domestic Israeli political considerations and the urgent need to score a win amid dramatic failures.
So far, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has failed to guarantee “security” to its citizens, in the sense of achieving any kind of effective victory against Hamas or Iran. Mass annihilation is not triumph. Israel has lost steam in its struggle to control the short- and medium-term futures of both Iran and Palestine.
Netanyahu’s closest ally, United States President Donald Trump, is negotiating directly with Iran. The US president is undoubtedly “briefing” Israeli officials, but is likely less than receptive to any Israeli advice given the failed Israeli promise of a quick and decisive win. Meanwhile, discussions about the future of Palestine are stalled while Hamas continues to be in control of parts of Gaza.
Israel is demanding that Hezbollah, like Hamas, be “completely disarmed”. That, according to anonymous Israeli army sources in Israeli media, can only be possible if Lebanon and Gaza are completely occupied.
Occupation is war, not a “military operation”; there are no heroic strikes, bombing videos or destruction posing as victory. Occupation, as Israel knows only too well, brings quotidian death, a slow drowning in the politics of oppression.
Still, Netanyahu wants to be the leader who fought the longest war in Israeli history and, hopefully for him, emerged as clearly and absolutely triumphant. Removing the presence of Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border is his only remaining opportunity to claim victory as Iran slips out of his grasp and Gaza becomes regional and international business.
When the population of Israel’s north was evacuated after the October 7 attacks, Israel ran rife with rumours about an inevitable Hezbollah invasion of the Israeli Galilee. The official fearmongers in Israeli TV studios talked a blue streak about the “plan” to “destroy” Israel from seven fronts, orchestrated from Tehran.
That Iran was not an existential threat, that a “preventive strike” was not warranted or prescribed, and that Hezbollah was not planning an invasion of Israel no longer matters.
Given the failures in Gaza and Iran, the prevention of a fictitious invasion by Hezbollah from the north is the only political promise Netanyahu hopes he can fulfil for future voters.
What is more, Lebanon presents an opportunity to apply the “straightforward” logic of the Israeli military. If all Shia villages are destroyed and their populations driven towards Beirut, the Israeli army would finally be able to carry out the original Gaza plan – whoever stays behind and does not choose the path of the refugee is Hezbollah, and would be summarily murdered.
Already, Shia villages are being demolished in Gaza-esque fashion throughout the south. The Israeli army has warned local Christian and Sunni leaders to give no harbour to escaping Shia. In the post-Gaza world, such actions are par for the course.
A plan that assumes Lebanese lives are worthless pawns in Israel’s “strategic” games is politically palatable for all Jewish Israeli politicians.
Additionally, it is apparently the most credible option as far as the international community is concerned. While all eyes are focused on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, Israel appears to literally get away with murder. The army can claim a total victory, Netanyahu can ensure his election, and Israelis can return to their favourite in-house fights of “liberals” vs “messianics”.
In lieu of a conclusion, it is useful to note what Israel is not doing. Despite the unknown number of Israeli troops operating inside southern Lebanon, the Israeli army has yet to embark on a full-scale invasion of the country as it did in 1982 (and possibly began to do again in 2006). The US has not attempted a ground invasion of Iranian territory yet, either.
Both countries understand that the desirability of a military victory does not detract from the immediate risks and prices of such an invasion. But perhaps there is hope that disaster can be averted.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect media’s editorial stance.
